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Minimum parking requirements are the norm for urban and suburban development in the United States (Davidson 
and Dolnick (2002)).  The justification for parking space requirements is that overflow parking will occupy nearby 
street or off-street parking.  Shoup (1999) and Willson (1995) provides cases where there is reason to believe that 
parking space requirements have forced parcel developers to place more parking than they would in the absence of 
parking requirements.  If the effect of parking minimums is to significantly increase the land area devoted to 
parking, then the increase in impervious surfaces would likely cause water quality degradation, increased flooding, 
and decreased groundwater recharge.  However, to our knowledge the existing literature does not test the effect of 
parking minimums on the amount of lot space devoted to parking beyond a few case studies. This paper tests the 
hypothesis that parking space requirements cause an oversupply of parking by examining the implicit marginal value 
of land allocated to parking spaces.  This is an indirect test of the effects of parking requirements that is similar to 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2003). A simple theoretical model shows that the marginal value of additional parking to the 
sale price should be equal to the cost of land plus the cost of parking construction.  We estimate the marginal values 
of parking and lot area with spatial methods using a large data set from the Los Angeles area non-residential 
property sales and find that for most of the property types the marginal value of parking is significantly below that 
of the parcel area.  This evidence supports the contention that minimum parking requirements significantly increase 
the amount of parcel area devoted to parking. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Most cities in the US have parking standards which require developers to provide a minimum 
amount of off-street parking per square foot of floor space.3 These minimum parking 
requirements are usually set by city planners from standardized transportation planning manuals, 
which typically measure parking and trip generation rates at peak periods with ample free 
parking and no public transit. The goal of Minimum Parking Requirements (MPRs) is to ensure 
adequate parking at a low price in order to limit local congestion and to stimulate local business 
(Shoup (1999)).  
Minimum parking requirements have been criticized due to their land and transportation 
market distortions.  Opponents of MPRs (Shoup (1999, 2005), Willson (1995)) argue that these 
parking standards create an oversupply of parking in most urban areas which decreases the cost 
(direct and time) of parking and therefore encourages more automobile trips (Shoup (1999, 
2005), Shoup and Pickrell (1978)). As the number of cars increase and mass transit use 
decreases, air quality decreases.  Decreased air quality creates and/or aggravates health problems 
for urban residents.  Individuals who suffer from pulmonary diseases such as asthma and 
bronchitis suffer as the increased number cars decrease air quality (EPA (1999, 2008), Shoup 
(1999)). In addition, critics allege that minimum parking requirements force developers to use 
more land space per square foot of building construction and make development in areas where 
land has a high value much more expensive and less profitable (Willson (1995)). As a result, 
minimum parking requirements influence the location of new development, make infill projects 
and historic building retrofits less attractive and feasible (Shoup and Pickrell (1978)) and 
contribute to the sprawling of impervious parking surface at the expense of the environment 
(Feitelson and Rotem (2004)) and urban design (Mukhija and Shoup (2006)). However, the 
previous debate does not consider other factors that may interact with MPRs such as Floor-Area-
Ratio (FAR) restrictions. A FAR restriction is a density regulation that imposes a restriction on a 
building’s FAR, which equals the total floor area in the building divided by the lot size. A limit 
on FAR thus prevents a developer from constructing tall buildings. 
                                                 
3 For example, the zoning ordinance for Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles requires three parking spaces per 1,000 
square feet of gross floor area for office buildings and other commercial uses (Shoup (1999)). 
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The purposes of this paper are twofold. First, we develop an analytical model of building 
construction that includes MPRs, FAR restrictions and endogenous decision-making over surface 
versus below-ground parking. This theoretical model allows us to formally examine the impacts 
of minimum parking requirements on development density, parking external costs and amount of 
parking supplied, adding to a small analytical literature on this regulation. And second, we test 
the hypothesis that parking requirements cause an oversupply of parking using data on 
commercial, industrial and retail property sales from Los Angeles County. 
Even though parking requirements are intensely debated in urban and transport planning 
arenas, little effort has been devoted to the theoretical analysis of this instrument. The only 
analytical studies are by Shoup and Pickrell (1978) and Feitelson and Rotem (2004). Both 
studies use graphical analysis to discuss the impacts of minimum parking requirements on 
parking price and quantity. Shoup and Pickrell (1978) focus their graphical discussion on how 
minimum parking requirements may affect the development of parking submarkets. They argue 
that if parking requirements are uniform throughout a jurisdiction while demand and supply vary 
by location, the requirements may force an increase in the total amount of parking provided but 
also an inefficient allocation of parking across space. Feitelson and Rotem (2004) focus their 
graphical discussion on the external costs of surface parking. The authors argue that even 
without minimum parking requirements, developers will oversupply parking because of the 
direct environmental negative externalities and the indirect sprawl-inducement externalities.  
There are also some theoretical analyses on the impacts of density zoning on the urban 
spatial structure and on the urban welfare (Arnott and Mackinnon (1977), Bertaud and Brueckner 
(2005)). For example, Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) show theoretically that FAR restrictions 
encourage urban sprawl and increase commuting costs for edge residents of a city. However, we 
are not aware of any analyses in the zoning literature that also take into account the interaction of 
FAR restrictions with transportation policies such as MPRs. Both FAR and MPR are land use 
regulations with impacts on structural densities. FAR restrictions are designed to deal with 
neighborhood crowding or congestion and regulate how buildings impede each other’s view and 
access to sunlight. MPRs on the other hand are designed to prevent traffic congestion effects and 
spillover parking effects - parking from a development that overflows into surrounding areas- 
from new development. However, because MPRs increase the costs of new development, these 
policies not only increase the cost of housing but may also reduce density at which developers 
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would otherwise be able to build new housing, potentially restricting the supply of new units. 
Additionally, these minimum standards may also counteract other local policies designed to 
encourage downtown density to increase agglomeration economies or policies designed to 
promote development in areas easily accessible by public transit. 
One of the advantages of constructing a theoretical model that captures the essence of the 
problems associated with minimum parking requirements is that such a model can develop and 
support hypothesis that we can test empirically. Moreover, it also may provide useful insights 
beyond those provided by earlier papers. For example, parking requirements can influence 
building density, but may not always be the largest barrier to density. Zoning conditions, in 
particular FAR restrictions may be a larger barrier in certain cases.  
Thus, in contrast to Shoup and Pickrell (1978) and Feitelson and Rotem (2004), we develop a 
theoretical framework where we model separately the behavior of city center developers and 
suburban developers and where parking and floor space are bundled and rented as a package to 
tenants of a building.  Both types of developers maximize profits. We extend previous analyses 
by considering two types of parking structures: underground parking or surface parking. 4  In our 
model surface parking also generates negative external environmental costs.  Another feature of 
our model is the presence of a floor-to-area (FAR) restriction. Within this model we examine not 
only the impact of MPRs on total parking supplied but also on the supply of different types of 
parking (surface and underground), building square footage and level of parking externality.  
Our analytical results show that surface parking is more efficient if the price of land is 
relatively low. For a sufficiently high price of land, the developer provides underground parking 
instead of surface parking. Because parking space is capitalized into rents, this will encourage 
developers to voluntarily supply parking space whenever the resulting revenue will cover its 
costs, even in the absence of parking requirements. Because developers do not take into account 
parking external costs, developers will oversupply parking in an unregulated market. The main 
effects of MPRs are that parking spaces will be priced below the cost of providing them and the 
external costs associated with surface parking will be exacerbated because MPRs exacerbate the 
market oversupply of parking. In addition, MPRs constitute an indirect tax on building square 
                                                 
4 We realize that there is also above-ground structure parking that is an intermediate choice between underground 
and surface parking, but we believe that the underground and surface parking captures the essential elements of the 
developer’s parking choice problem. 
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footage which creates a disincentive to high-density development. In particular, minimum 
parking requirements may drive the total square footage allowed and potentially inhibit density 
below what a FAR limit permits.5 However, in areas with stringent limits on building height and 
where parking can feasibly be provided, our analytic results suggest that FAR limits may be a 
more important constraint on densities. 
Parking lots occupy a significant proportion of the built cover in many urban and suburban 
areas.  Ferguson (2005) estimates that in multi-family areas parking lots comprise about 30% of 
the built cover and in commercial areas parking lots comprise about 60% of the built cover. 
Increases in impermeable surfaces such as parking have important environmental consequences 
because impermeable surfaces are thought to cause a variety of environmental, mainly water-
related externalities (Arnold and Gibbons (1996)). If the effect of parking minimums is to 
significantly increase the land area devoted to parking, the increase in impervious surfaces would 
likely cause water quality degradation, increased flooding, and decreased groundwater recharge.  
Thus, knowledge of whether or not MPRs are binding is important information. 
Shoup (1999) and Willson (1995) provide cases where there is reason to believe that parking  
requirements have forced developers to place more parking than they would in the absence of 
this regulation. However, we are not aware of any broad based empirical evidence that tests 
whether it appears that developers are placing significantly more parking on their land than they 
would in the absence of parking requirements.  In addition, to our knowledge there is also no 
study that examines which land use categories are most affected by minimum parking 
requirements.  
In this paper we test the hypothesis that parking space requirements cause an oversupply of 
parking using both direct and indirect approaches. Our direct test compares actual versus 
required parking for a subsample of our data where we are able to approximate MPRs for the 
property. Our indirect approach uses the gap between the marginal parking space costs and the 
marginal value of an additional parking space to the sale price to measure the extent of 
oversupply of parking. Based on our analytical results, this gap should be zero whenever MPRs 
are not binding. Therefore, if MPRs bind this wedge should be positive. Our indirect test is thus 
very similar to Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) who use the gap between real estate prices and the 
                                                 
5 This could occur whenever the amount of parking is constrained for example due to site geometry (size and shape) 
and/or inconvenient site topography (slopes and poor soil conditions) which substantially increase parking costs. 
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costs of producing a marginal apartment to measure the distortions in the housing market caused 
by zoning restrictions on new construction.6 
We estimate the marginal values of parking and lot area with spatial and non-spatial methods 
from Los Angeles area non-residential property sales. The data encompass a wide variety of 
industrial, service, shopping and general retail properties, and office properties from 1997-2005. 
We use a spatial hedonic approach that includes property and locational characteristics and 
various controls for spatial dependence.  
Significant work has been done using hedonic methods to examine how various attributes 
affect the sale price of non-residential parcels.  Most of this work relates to the determinants of 
commercial property sale indices.7 This literature considers a variety of locational, 
neighborhood, building and parcel characteristics, but we are only aware of one previous study 
that considers the amount of parking on the property (Cutter and DeWoody (2010)).  In addition, 
other work attempts to value environmental disamenities by examining whether property prices 
change in response to the listing or de-listing of hazardous waste sites near a property (Ihlanfeldt 
and Taylor (2004)).  We use a spatial hedonic approach where parking area, a characteristic that 
has only been included in Cutter et al. (2010), is one of the characteristics of the property.  
Our empirical results find that the marginal value of parking on a lot appears to be 
significantly less than the marginal value of parcel area in several land-use categories in all 
specifications.  The difference between the marginal parking and marginal property area values 
is significant and supports the contention that minimum parking space requirements substantially 
increase the amount of parcel area allocated to parking by developers. Our direct test of whether 
                                                 
6 The authors provide evidence that zoning is in fact constraining the supply of housing in a number of housing 
markets across the United States. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) emphasize that there is no reason why housing prices 
cannot fall below construction costs in declining areas. In those areas, there will be no construction and any 
regulation that place limits on residential building would not bind.    
7 Some examples are Hodgson et al. (2006) and Colwell et al. (1998). Other empirical studies have examined 
demand side and supply side influences on office-commercial rents. Clapp (1980) tested the rent-accessibility trade-
off using 105 office buildings data in Los Angeles and found significant evidence to support the negative rental 
function with respects to the distance from the CBD and the commuting time. His results also supported the 
importance of face-to-face interaction in the CBD. Using a more recent set of office rental data in Greater Los 
Angeles from the same source, Sivitanidou (1995) again found that the accessibility factors (distance to CBD, 
distance to airport and number of interstate freeways) are significantly reflected in variations of the office rental 
function. However, the author found that the standard bid-rent function is incomplete in explaining office bid-rent 
relationships unless other variables like worker amenities, zoning and local institutional control are included in the 
model. Sivitanidou (1996) shows that office-commercial firms value access to service centers within Los Angeles 
PMSA (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area). None of these previous studies examine how parking area influences 
office-commercial bid rent functions. 
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MPRs bind, which uses a subsample of office properties, shows also that properties tend to have 
just the minimum parking requirement or somewhat less parking than required.  
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides the regulatory background for 
Minimum Parking Requirements and describes the environmental impacts associated with 
conventional parking lots. Section 3 outlines the theoretical model and examines the impacts of 
minimum parking requirements on the supply of surface parking, supply of underground parking, 
building density and level of parking externalities. Section 4 develops the empirical model. 
Section 5 describes our data and variables. Section 6 discusses our parking regulation tests. 
Section 7 presents the empirical results and discusses their implications and finally, Section 8 
offers conclusions. 
 
2. Regulatory and Environmental Background 
2.1. Minimum Parking Requirements 
The minimum parking requirements for cities in the Los Angeles area are Byzantine in their 
complexity.8  Parking requirements can differ significantly across property types that would 
seem similar to the uninitiated.  The basis also can differ.  Many requirements are expressed as 
numbers of parking spaces per square foot of gross building floor area, but other depend on 
adjusted gross area, number of employees, number of seats in a restaurant, and other more 
complex ratios.  In addition, cities often have different zones where different parking 
requirements apply.  Finally, projects can be granted variances from general MPRs. For all these 
reasons, a direct approach to estimating the effect of parking minimums on the amount of 
parking space, such as regressing parking area on the parking minimum and controls, faces 
serious obstacles because it would be very difficult to know what MPR applies to a property.   
This point is reinforced by our data analysis. We analyze data for a subsample of properties 
(office buildings in certain cities) where the current MPR requirements were only based on 
square footage of the building and examined the ratio of actual to required parking spaces. We 
found the mean ratio is .97, indicating that these buildings usually have close but slightly less 
parking than required. However, many buildings have many fewer than the required number of 
spaces in current regulation.  The 25th percentile of actual to required spaces is .72, so 25% of 
                                                 
8 For instance, the Santa Monica requirement for health clubs is “1 space per 80 sq. ft. of exercise area, 1 space per 
each 300 sq. ft. of locker room/sauna/ shower area, plus applicable code requirement for other uses.”    
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properties have less than 72% of the required spaces.  This could either be the result of not 
having the exact parking requirements at the time of construction or widespread exceptions 
(variances) allowing less than the MPR.   
If widespread variances exist, then it could be that, while in theory MPRs produce inefficient 
outcomes, in practice local authorities consider the costs and benefits for MPRs and grant 
variances where costs of compliance are particularly high and by doing this they reduce the 
social cost of MPRs. Shoup (2005) states that many municipalities rely on the Institute of 
Transportation Engineers (ITE) parking generation rate studies, and in particular their maximum 
generation rate9, to set minimum parking standards. However, our data raises the possibility that 
the actual requirements for projects can be lower than the regulatory standards criticized by 
Shoup (2005).  This is similar to the common finding in the environmental regulatory literature 
that local regulators adjust regulations for the costs and benefits of pollution control at a 
particular facility (Gray and Deily (1991)).  Our indirect method avoids the pitfall of assuming 
that MPRs apply uniformly and tests whether parking requirements, as they are actually applied, 
result in economic distortions. 
 
2.2. Environmental Costs of Parking 
Parking lots degrade air and water quality (Akbari et al. (2001)), decrease the amount of 
greenspaces, increase urban heat island effects, and can decrease water supply (Cutter et al. 
(2008)). These negative environmental externalities will differ in their magnitude from place to 
place.  
The water-related externalities are generated because parking lots are impervious to water 
and moisture and therefore cause more rainfall to flow off the surface as runoff. This decreases 
water supplies as groundwater aquifers are not recharged and decreases surface water quality as 
the runoff tends to accumulate oil, grease, and other pollutants from the pavement.  Cutter et al. 
(2008) estimates that an additional acre of impervious surface can decrease annual infiltration 
                                                 
9 These figures are based on studies where a land use category is observed over several days to several weeks and 
the maximum observed parking spaces over that period of time is designated as the maximum parking generation 
rate.  I.e. if a shopping center were observed over five weekdays and the maximum occupied parking spaces over 
that period was 300, that would be the maximum parking generation rate for that observation.  Then the average of 
those maximum parking generation rates (usually per square foot) is the maximum parking generation rate for that 
land-use category. 
 9
and recharge to groundwater supplies by 1.1 acre-feet per year with a present value loss of 
$16,400 in water value.   
Pollutant air emissions also occur through the lifecycle of a parking lot (EPA (2008)). 
Asphalt cement plants emit particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide 
and carbon dioxide during the manufacturing process. The activities associated with construction 
and maintenance of parking lots also generate emissions in the form of dust, fumes and 
equipment and vehicle exhaust. The after effects of parking lot construction, such as fewer trees 
and less vegetation due to clearing also lead to higher amounts of carbon dioxide in the air.  
In addition, parking is generally constructed of dark asphalt that, together with other built up 
dark surfaces generates an urban heat island effect.  Akbari et al. (2001) estimates that the urban 
heat island effect in Los Angeles increases power consumption by 1-1.5 GW at a cost of $100 
million per year. Also, the higher temperatures due to the urban heat island effect increases 
ozone (smog) production. Taha (2008a,b) shows that replacement of low-albedo surfaces such as 
parking with vegetation can result in significant decreases in ozone levels 
 
 3. The Analytical Model 
This section describes the features of the analytical model we will use to examine the impacts 
of minimum parking requirements on structural density, amount of land developed and type of 
parking supplied. We also provide and interpret key equations associated with the developers’ 
problem in the absence and presence of minimum parking requirements. Complete derivations 
are provided in Appendix A. 
 
3.1. Model Assumptions 
 
Office-Commercial Rents 
Suppose that the office-commercial-space bid rent in a given location is represented by:10 
                                                 
10 The office-commercial bid rent represents the maximum willingness-to-pay by a firm for commercial-office space 
in a building at particular location within the city. In this paper we focus on the behavior of developers and 
therefore, we do not derive analytically equation (1). However, a demand model for office space, see for example 
Sivitanidou and Wheaton (1992), would suggest that the quantity demanded is a function of rent, a firm’s output, 
and the amount of office space it uses per worker. If the output market is competitive, in the long-run a firm’s profit 
is zero. From this latter condition we can thus determine the equilibrium rent per unit of floor space (1). Moreover, 
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),( ANfB =                                                                                                                         (1) 
where, B  is the office-commercial rent per unit of floor space, N  is total parking spaces and A  
represents a vector of amenities associated with the location. Equation (1) thus suggests that 
parking spaces are capitalized into bid rents11 . Because we focus on a single location the value 
of A  is fixed. We assume that (1) is concave in its arguments.  
Parking space can take two forms: surface parking and underground parking. Surface parking 
refers to lots directly on land and underground parking consists of structured parking under 
multi-story buildings. 12  Both forms are assumed to be perfect substitutes from the tenants’ 
perspective and therefore, total parking spaces are represented by: 
us NNN +=                                                                                                                           (2) 
where sN is number of surface parking spaces and uN  is number of underground parking 
spaces. 
 
Building Technology 
Office-commercial floor space is produced according to a strictly concave, constant-returns 
production function, ),( LKfH = , where K  is capital used to produce floor space and L  is the 
amount of land physically covered by K  (referred to subsequently as “covered land”).  The 
intensive form of this production function is written as )(Sh , where S  is capital per unit of 
covered land or structural density and h  satisfies 0>′h  and 0// <h . )(Sh  represents office-
commercial total floor space per unit of covered land. We assume that L is fixed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
for simplicity, we assume that bid rents reflect prevailing market prices for office floor space, so that the two are 
synonymous. Thus, the price of an office building would be the product of the bid-rent and total office floor space. 
11 Building characteristics can influence the bid rent for office-commercial space at a particular location. Rents are 
higher for buildings with greater total square footage, more floors and parking space. A higher total square footage 
may be also indicative of building amenities (e.g. restaurants), face-to-face agglomeration economies or shopping 
externalities. Office-commercial bid rents are also influenced by locational factors such access to the central 
business district, access to surface and air transportation (freeways and major airports), access to good schools and 
level of crime. For empirical evidence on the determinants of office-commercial bid rents see Sivitanidou (1995) 
and Bollinger et al. (1998). 
12 Other types of parking facilities include on-street parking, off-street parking and structured parking in multistory 
buildings. On-street parking consists of parking lanes provided within public road rights-of-way. Off-street parking 
are parking facilities on their own land, not on road rights-of-way. Structured parking (also called parkades or 
ramps) are parking facilities in or under multistory buildings.  It is not uncommon to find structured parking in 
downtown areas since land costs are very high. For simplicity we only analyze the cases of surface and underground 
parking (structured parking under multi-story buildings). However, our results on underground parking can also be 
extended to other types of structured parking. 
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Parking Costs 
Parking costs differ depending on the type of parking facility provided. Construction costs 
(excluding land) per space of surface parking are lower than the construction costs per space for 
underground parking (Hunnicutt (1982)).13 However, surface parking precludes alternative uses 
of land and hence its total costs are the sum of total construction costs and land costs ( )( ss NC ): 
)()( lpKpNNC lksss +=                                                                                                       (3) 
where lp  and kp  are the exogenous prices of land and capital, K is the fixed amount of 
capital per surface parking space and l is the fixed amount of land per surface parking space. 
We assume that no additional land is necessary for underground parking since it will be built 
below the office-commercial building. Therefore, total costs for underground parking reflects 
mainly its construction costs: 
),(),( SNKpNSNC ukuuu =                                                                                                   (4) 
where )( uNK  is the capital cost requirement per underground parking space and is assumed 
to be a convex function with 0),(
2
>
∂∂
∂
SN
SNK
u
u  . The reason is because as more underground parking 
is added more units of capital are necessary to fortify the building structure and to provide 
vertical-transportation requirements. 
 
Surface Parking Externalities  
Surface parking generates multiple environmental externalities. Let sL be the amount of 
impervious land due to surface parking and )( sLE  denote the external costs associated with 
impervious surfaces. We assume that )( sLE  is linear in the amount of land allocated to surface 
parking: 
ss eLLE =)(                                                                                                                              (5) 
where 0>e is the unit of land external cost and lNL ss = . 
 
Parking Requirements  
                                                 
13 Construction costs (excluding land) average about $1,600 per space for surface parking and $20,000 or more per 
space for underground parking (Hunnicutt (1982)).  
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The city government imposes a minimum parking requirement expressed as numbers of 
parking spaces per square foot of gross building floor area:  
)(SaLhN ≥                                                                                                                              (6) 
where 10 << a  is a parameter imposed by the city government.14   
 
Floor-Area-Ratio (FAR) restrictions  
There is also an upper limit on the square footage of office-commercial space per unit of land 
such that:  
)ˆ(ˆ)( ShSh ≤                                                                                                                              (7) 
where ĥ  is the FAR limit per unit of land and Ŝ  is the total structural density associated with 
ĥ . 
 
3.2 Type of parking provided 
Differentiating (1) with respect to sN  and uN , yields the same marginal benefit for both types 
of parking spaces:  
 
us N
N
N
ANB
N
N
N
ANB
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂ ),(),(                                                                                             (8) 
As a result, the developer determines which type of parking space will be provided based on 
the marginal cost. The private marginal cost per space of underground parking is given by: 
u
u
ukk N
SNK
NpKp
∂
∂
+
),(                                                                                                         (9) 
The first component of (9) is the marginal cost for the additional underground parking space, 
which is the same for all parking spaces in the structure. The second component of (9) is the 
inframarginal cost associated with the additional underground space. Note that the marginal cost 
of underground parking increases with the height of the building because of the costs of 
providing vertical transport and supporting a heavier building. 
                                                 
14 Note that H(K,L)=Lh(S). Since H(K,L) is concave and homogenous of degree one, it follows that H(K/L,1)= h(S). 
Also, the value of a can be lower, equal or higher than the value of a that would exist in an unconstrained market. 
However, for the purpose of exploring the effects of minimum parking requirements we consider the case where a is 
such that the constraint is always binding and thus, affects the market equilibrium. If for example, a =1/200sft, it 
means that developers are required to provide one parking space for each 200sft of gross floor area. 
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The private marginal cost per space of surface parking is given by: 
lpKp lk +                                                                                                                             (10) 
The first component of (10) is the marginal cost for the additional surface parking space and 
the second component is the marginal cost of land. In contrast to (9), the marginal cost of surface 
parking is constant and thus, it does not vary with the amount of parking space. 
Comparing (9) and (10), the marginal cost of underground parking is greater than the 
marginal cost of surface parking if the cost of land is small relative to the degree of diminishing 
marginal returns: 
lp
N
SNK
Np l
u
u
uk >∂
∂ ),(                                                                                                         (11) 
Equation (11) suggests that surface parking is more efficient if the price of land is relatively 
low.15 For a sufficiently high price of land, the developer provides underground parking instead 
of surface parking.16 Given that land prices are typically very high in downtown areas, it is not 
surprising that most parking bundled with office-commercial development in Central Business 
Districts (CBD) is structured parking. In contrast, low-density office-commercial structures with 
large surface parking lots such as shopping malls are mostly found in suburban areas where the 
price of land is lower. 
Next we specify the developer’s problem separately for the suburbs and the central city 
taking into account the FAR restriction and Minimum Parking Requirements (MPRs).17 Given 
                                                 
15 Structured parking typically becomes cost effective when land prices exceed about $1 million per acre. 
16 If the marginal benefit of underground parking exceeds the marginal benefit of surface parking because of 
differences in the costs and speeds of walking and elevator travel, then the developer may provide underground 
parking even if the price of land is relatively low: 
lp
N
SNK
Np
N
N
N
NSh
N
B
l
u
u
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su
−
∂
∂
>⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
∂
∂ ),()(  
If 
su N
N
N
N
∂
∂
−
∂
∂ is large enough to offset the diminishing marginal returns from underground parking, then 
underground parking will be provided. Note also that a developer could choose a combination of surface and 
underground parking spaces that minimizes total costs of providing parking spaces. However, in this paper we focus 
only on boundary solutions and we assume that a developer can only provide underground or surface parking 
spaces, but not both types. 
17 In addition to these land use regulations, other parking and zoning policies may be in place that may influence the 
supplies of parking and office-commercial floor-area. Such additional parking policies include shared parking, site-
specific reductions and cash in lieu. Among non-FAR limitations on building size and form are set-back 
requirements, open space requirements, height limits and bulk regulations, which require minimum sky exposure to 
the street. Because an analysis of the interactions between all these policies and FAR and MPR regulations would be 
very cumbersome without adding to the discussion, we do not address them in our analysis. We hope to revisit some 
of these limitations in future research.  
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the preceding discussion, we assume that CBD developers provide underground parking and 
suburban developers provide surface parking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Central Business District (CBD)  
The developer’s problem in the central city is to choose the level of structural density and 
number of underground parking spaces that maximize his profits per unit of covered land taking 
into account the FAR restriction and MPRs:18  
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For the sake of expository convenience, we represent the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an 
interior solution for problem (12) in Table 1, where 1λ  is the shadow price associated with the 
FAR constraint and 2λ  is the shadow price associated with the MPR constraint.
19 All the first-
order conditions are evaluated at the optimum levels. For full details see Appendix A. 
There are three main conclusions that we can take upon examining table 1. First, because 
parking is capitalized into office-commercial rents, this will encourage developers to voluntarily 
supply parking whenever the resulting revenue will cover its costs, even in the absence of MPRs 
(( 01 =λ , 02 =λ ) and ( 01 >λ , 02 =λ )). If the price of additional underground parking 
( )(),( *
*
Sh
N
ANB
u
u
∂
∂ ) is at or above the marginal cost of providing it (
u
uu
N
SNC
∂
∂ ),( ** ), there is no 
                                                 
18Equation (12) also implies that total floor space and parking space are “bundled” and rented as a package to the 
tenants of a building. For example, in nearly all buildings in Los Angeles today, parking is included in the price or 
rent of the unit. Tenants do not have the option of “unbundling” the cost of parking from their purchase or rent. The 
main exception is in the Downtown area where some buildings do not include parking in their rental rates.  
19 This shadow price (the Lagrange multiplier) provides a measure of how a relaxation in the constraint will affect 
the developer’s profit per unit of covered land. Thus, a high value of iλ  indicates that the profit per unit of land 
could be increased substantially by relaxing the constraint. In contrast, a low value of iλ  indicates that there is not 
much to be gained by relaxing the constraint. When 0=iλ , the constraint is not binding. 
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reason why developers would not provide it on their own in downtown areas ( 0* >uN ). Thus, 
even in the absence of MPRs, developers can offer a bundle of (parking spaces, floor space) as a 
strategy to maximize profits.20 The main effects of MPRs (see both cases where 02 >λ )  are that 
parking spaces will be priced below the cost of providing them (for example 
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∂ ) and total supply of parking will be above its market 
determined equilibrium level ( *umpru NN > ).  
Second, parking requirements may also cause serious problems in the office-commercial 
floor space market. When MPRs bind ( 02 >λ ), the excess underground parking results in a 
deficit for the developer of a new building. This induced deficit constitutes an indirect tax on 
building square footage ( 0)(2 >
∂
∂
S
Sh
N
L mpr
mpr
u
λ ). As a result, this creates a disincentive to high-
density development ( mprSS >* ) because it imposes an extra wedge between the marginal 
revenue gain from additional building square footage (
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)ˆ,( ). Since the marginal cost of providing more parking spaces 
at a site usually increases dramatically for underground structures 
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uu ), this parking tax is also higher for larger buildings. 
Finally, FAR restrictions also constitute a tax on building square footage which leads to 
building heights smaller than those in unconstrained markets ( FARSS >* ). Based on current 
construction costs, a developer might want to build a taller structure than allowed by density 
controls and provide the requisite parking in order to maximize returns, even in the absence of 
parking requirements ( 01 >λ , 02 =λ ).  
Minimum parking requirements may nevertheless drive the total square footage allowed and 
potentially inhibit density below what the FAR limit permits, in particular when the amount of 
                                                 
20 In this paper, decisions to bundle parking into rents are freely-made private decisions, not forced by excessive 
parking requirements. Thus, even in the absence of MPRs, bundling of parking remains persistent. A possible reason 
that may prompt developers to bundle parking is the absence of priced parking nearby. Examining underlying causes 
of persisting bundling is outside the scope of this study.   
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parking is constrained due to site geometry (size and shape) and site topography (slopes and poor 
soil conditions). Site geometry and site topology may make the required parking not physically 
fit on to a site and increase substantially parking costs and thus, 2λ . In this situation S
ShFAR
∂
∂ )ˆ(
1λ  
may be smaller than   
S
Sh
N
L mpr
mpr
u
mpr
∂
∂ )(2λ  and thus, mprSS >ˆ . However, in areas with stringent limits 
on building height and where parking can feasibly be provided underground, parking 
requirements may not be the greatest constraint on densities. When both regulatory restrictions 
bind ( 01 =λ , 02 =λ ), it may be the case that the FAR limit pushes densities further down than 
MPR. 
Our results thus show that minimum parking requirements have counterproductive results in 
downtown areas because they try to solve a problem in the transportation market that is only 
indirectly related to the office-commercial floor space market. Because minimum parking 
requirements increase the costs of new development, these minimum standards tend to decrease 
the potential office-commercial density of new projects which is counter the objective of most 
cities to promote downtown density to increase agglomeration economies and control for urban 
sprawl. In addition, minimum parking requirements may also counteract other local policies 
designed to encourage development in areas easily accessible by public transit as well as 
compromise the feasibility of mass-transit investments in certain downtown areas.  
 
3.4. Suburban Areas 
The developer’s problem in the suburbs is to choose the level of structural density and 
number of surface parking spaces that maximizes his profits per unit of land covered taking into 
account the FAR restriction and Minimum Parking Requirements (MPRs):  
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Since the capital-to-land ratio tends to decrease with distance from a CBD, it follows that a 
FAR restriction will bind in the central part of a city, where the capital-to-land ratio would 
normally be high, being nonbinding farther from the center (Bertaud and Brueckner (2005)). 
Thus, we focus our discussion on the cases where only the MPR restriction is binding. The 
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Kuhn-Tucker conditions for an interior solution for problem (13) when the FAR restriction is not 
binding are presented in Table 2. Again, 1λ  represents the shadow price associated with the FAR 
constraint and 2λ  is the shadow price associated with the MPR constraint. All first order 
conditions are evaluated at the optimum. For full details see Appendix A.  
Parking supply imposes the negative externalities discussed in Section 2. Upon examining 
Table 2, it is clear that whenever private decisions do not take into account these negative 
externalities, too much surface parking is provided even in the absence of MPR.21  
Notice that the socially optimal number of surface parking spaces maximizes
L
leNs
s +π , 
where sπ  is profit per unit of land covered. The first order condition for the social optimal 
surface parking spaces, osN , is given by: 
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Comparing (14) and the first order condition in absence of regulatory constraints ( 01 =λ  
and 02 =λ ) one notices that because of the negative externalities associated with impervious 
surface, the social marginal cost of surface parking (
L
Kplep kl ++ )( ) is higher than the private 
marginal cost (
L
Kplp kl + ). As a result, the socially efficient amount of land in surface parking 
( osNl ) is less than the privately optimal amount ( *sNl ). Thus, if left to the market the supply of 
surface parking is likely to be excessive.22 Not only are socially beneficial uses of surface 
                                                 
21 Our argument ignores the free rider congestion effect. The free rider problem with respect to private downtown 
parking provision is a potentially serious one and is the justification for MPRs in the first place. Therefore, one 
would need to consider this explicitly before claiming that too much land is allocated to surface parking. However, 
to the extent that most parking in downtown areas is underground and our surface parking analysis is related to 
suburban areas where this problem is not so severe, we have decided not to model this effect in our suburban 
developer problem since it would make the analysis cumbersome without additional insights. Moreover, Cutter and 
DeWoody (2010) indicates that, to the extent congestion effects are capitalized into real estate values, the 
externalities are only significant for commercial parking garages and are not large for on-site private parking. 
22 Government can encourage the social amount of both surface and underground parking through the imposition of 
a Pigouvian tax, where the magnitude of the tax is set equal to the marginal external effect at the efficient allocation. 
This would require imposition of a per unit tax on surface parking, where the magnitude of the tax is set equal to the 
dollar value of the environmental external costs. Alternatively, the government can also set a maximum parking 
requirement for surface parking, where the requirement would be equal to the social optimum. However, even if 
markets should be able to provide about the right amount of parking, there are inadequate economic incentives for 
quality, although planners could address some of the concerns over the quality of parking by requiring better design 
of lots and parking structures (Mukhija and Shoup (2006)).  
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parking land foregone, but because land is paved, it also increases storm water runoff and has 
other negative environmental impacts.  
In the context of the monocentric city model, the spatial area of the city can be found by 
adding total land in office-commercial use and total land in surface parking. Given that 
*
sNl
o
sNl <  the market equilibrium is characterized by inefficient spatial expansion of the urban 
area, providing a basis also for criticism of urban sprawl.23 
Like in downtown areas, MPRs also enforce an oversupply of parking in suburban areas 
( *SmprS NN > ) which, intensifies the external costs associated with impervious surface coverage: 
o
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* . Because minimum parking requirements increase the cost of development, 
densities are also lower in suburban areas compared to the unconstraint market outcome 
( mprSS >* ). 
Note that in equilibrium, the shadow price associated with the MPRs satisfies: 
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From (15) land uses that have higher parking requirements such as retail versus warehouses 
and thus have a higher value of a , are expected to have also a higher shadow price, 2λ . Moreover, 
if MPRs do not bind ( 02 =λ ), then the marginal value of parking should be equal to the marginal 
value of additional land plus marginal parking construction costs. If parking constraints bind, the 
marginal parking use value should be less than the land value plus construction costs ( 02 >λ ). 
 
3.5. Testable Hypothesis 
The predicted theoretical relationships between marginal parking use value, marginal land 
value, and marginal building area value give us the testable hypotheses for the empirical portion 
of the paper.  With proper data, we can estimate the shadow price associated with MPR and 
make inferences about the underlying equilibrium. For example, in the case of surface parking, 
the shadow price can be calculated with equation (15). Calculating the extensive margin value of 
land is simple once we have the construction cost data and the parking requirements data. 
However, the additional value of a property from adding an additional parking space cannot be 
                                                 
23 Other causes of urban sprawl can be found in Brueckner (2000) and Bento, Franco and Kaffine (2006).  
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calculated explicitly. It must be inferred using hedonic regression techniques to estimate the 
marginal contribution of each type of parking space to the price of the office-commercial 
building.   
Our model also implies that the marginal revenue from additional building area should equal 
marginal construction costs in the absence of binding parking requirements, but be greater than 
marginal construction costs if parking constraints bind. We do not test this second hypothesis in 
the present version of this paper, but may examine it in the future. 
 
4. The Empirical Model 
The empirical part of this paper focuses on the office-commercial-industrial property market 
within suburban areas of Los Angeles and on surface parking lots. The suburban market was 
chosen because, as our analytical results suggest, in downtown areas FAR restrictions are likely 
to bind which in turn can influence development density and the amount of land allocated to 
surface parking and parking density per acre.24 Moreover, surface parking in downtown LA also 
results from a speculative decision process.25 Therefore, isolating the effect of MPR on the 
amount of land allocated to parking in the built-up areas of Los Angeles may be tricky. In further 
research we hope to investigate the claims by critics that parking restrictions in fact prevent 
developers from attaining the maximum FAR. In addition, our analytical results also suggest that 
surface parking is more efficient if the price of land is relatively low. Given that land prices are 
typically lower in the suburbs compared to downtown areas it is not surprising that most surface 
parking occurs in the outskirts of the city. 
                                                 
24 In some cases, zoning regulations include bonus programs that permit developers to exceed the base maximum 
FAR if they include certain amenities such as affordable housing. 
25 Landowners may face uncertainty that increases the value of waiting to develop the parcel or may anticipate 
higher profits from developing at a later date. If future needs are uncertain and land use is not easily adaptable 
(because the developed structure is durable), it may maximize the landowner’s return to keep land undeveloped or 
underdeveloped (for example developed with a cheap land use such as surface parking that allows land to be put to 
some current use without requiring significant demolition costs in the future) and reserve it for the more highly 
valued future use than to develop it today. The landowner who keeps land or development capacity off the market is 
thus taking an option on future development. It has been shown that uncertainty results in a price premium for 
vacant or underused land (after accounting for demolition costs) and/or that it reduces current development, 
suggesting that investors recognize the value of real options in real estate development (Sivitanidou and Sivitanides 
(2000), Cunningham (2006), Grenadier (1996), Holland et al. (2000)). It is also possible that underused land in 
downtown LA is due to institutional or regulatory barriers and not just landowners’ calculation of expected returns. 
Zoning ordinances, building codes and historic preservation obligations may keep land from being developed. 
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We estimate the marginal values of parking and lot area with spatial and non-spatial methods 
from Los Angeles area non-residential property sales. In order to simulate the marginal on-site 
parking and parcel values we estimate a spatial error model for different land-use categories 
because parking requirements often differ across land use types (ITE 1985.) 
 
4.1. Hedonic Price Model 
The bid-rent function given by (1) is the starting point for our hedonic price function 
specification. This equation implies that office-commercial buildings can largely be considered 
as bundles of attributes that cannot easily be repackaged to suit individual preferences. The 
attributes typically evaluated by buyers in the housing market include not only structural 
characteristics of the properties, but also neighborhood attributes linked to the properties.26  
We use specifications of the following form in our hedonic price regression: 
LPit = β0 + β j LXijt + δ j Dij
j=1
J
∑
j=1
J
∑ + α tYt
t=1
T
∑ +εi                                                                (16) 
In (16) itLP  represents the log of the sale price of property i  at time t , 20051997 −=t . ijtX  is a 
vector containing j continuous property characteristics of property i  in time t , and jiD ,  are j  
binary property characteristics of property i .27  tY  is a dummy variable indicating the year the 
property was last sold. 0β  is the intercept regression coefficient and jβ , jδ  and tα  represent the 
regression coefficients associated with the explanatory variables.  The error term is iε . Note that 
our logarithmic form is an approximation to the nonlinearities usually involved in the solution of 
models such as the one presented in section 3.  
 
4.2. General Spatial Model 
Spatial econometric techniques are now common in estimating the determinants of property 
prices because of the likelihood of unobserved spatial relationships. This is because nearby 
properties are likely to have similar unobservable characteristics (Bell and Bockstael (2000), 
                                                 
26 Neighborhood attributes may include physical characteristics of the neighborhood, the socio-economic 
characteristics of the local residents, public service provisions, and environmental amenities.  
27 The log transformation of the continuous property characteristics is consistent with past hedonic literature on 
housing and commercial/retail/industrial properties (Hodgson et al. (2006)). In addition, Cutter and DeWoody  
(2010) shows that this specification is superior for a similar data set.  
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Ihlanfeldt and Taylor (2004)). As a result, inference based on t-statistics will be misleading. The 
spatial econometric literature has focused on two different types of spatial autocorrelation: 
spatial error dependence and spatial lag dependence (LeSage, (1999)). The first refers to the 
correlated errors that occur among the independent variables. It is also called spatial 
heteroskedasticity. It can rise from omitted variables, variable measurement error or 
misspecification of the functional form. The second refers to the correlated errors that occur 
between the dependent variables. It can be said to be spatial autocorrelation. Thus, we first 
estimate the joint spatial hedonic model that accounts for both types of spatial dependence: 
 ε = ρW1  LP + λW2e + u                     (17) 
with this error term substituted into equation 16 we have: 
     µλραδββ ++++++= eWLPWYDLXLP 2110                                                             (17a) 
where ρ  measures the degree of spatial lag, 1W   is a nearest-neighbor spatial weighting matrix, 
LP is the vector of property prices, λ is a scalar measuring the degree of spatial correlation, 2W is 
an inverse-distance weighting matrix, and e and u are i.i.d disturbances. If ρ  is significant, then 
the non-spatial estimate will generally be biased. Therefore, it is important to test for spatial lag. 
Not accounting for spatial correlation does not bias coefficients, but does result in inefficient 
estimation. 
 
4.3. Simulation Methodology 
We estimate the model of equation 16 using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation 
methodology (the results are almost identical to the standard spatial estimate but more 
convenient for the simulations.)28 The method generates multiple draws (10,000) of the 
coefficient vector and the idiosyncratic error term: 
)ˆ,ˆ(~ TN ββ                                                                                                                           (18) 
 u ~ N (0,σ
2 In )                                                                                                                     (19) 
                                                 
28 The results are from the sem_g estimation procedure in Jame P. LeSage’s Econometric Toolbox for Matlab, with 
the variance assumed homoskedastic (http://www.spatial-econometrics.com/). In Cutter (2010) we found that 
allowing for heteroskedastic variance does not change the key conclusions so in this paper we opt for the simpler 
model. 
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The coefficients in Table 4 are the mean of these draws. The observation-specific error draw is 
generated by the following equation:29 
ε = (In − λ̂W2 )
−1µ                                                                                                                (20) 
 We substitute β  and ε  into Equation 16 and calculate a predicted property price for each draw-
property attributes combination (10,000 draws). We follow the simulation procedure suggested 
Krinsky and Robb (1986) to estimate marginal values. First, the predicted sale price vector is 
estimated for each draw using this equation: 
Pi = ς exp(βXi + ε i )                                                                                                             (21) 
where,  iP  is the predicted price, 
 
ς = n−1 e öε i
i=1
n
∑  is the “smearing” adjustment for transforming the 
log price prediction into a consistent linear price estimate, and X = [Ln(x) Y  D]  are the observed 
independent variables. 
Next, we calculate a new matrix of independent variables based on adding a small area 
(denotedδ ) to either on-site parking or parcel area and we recalculate our variables, including 
any interaction terms.  This results in a new independent variable matrix, X% . Then, we calculate 
a new predicted price based on X% , β  and µ : 
 Pi = ς exp(β
%Xi + ε i )                  (22)                                    
Once we have (22), we calculate a vector of the price difference per change in area δ  for 
each property: 
      
δ
ii
i
PP
D
−
=                                                                                                                           (23) 
This is our estimate for marginal land and parking values for each property. We need to use 
property-by-property calculation because the estimated hedonic equation is non-linear and each 
property is at a different location on the hedonic surface.  
With 10,000 draws from the of β and µ we take the average over each iD vectors as the 
mean marginal value for the change in area for property i . We use this procedure to approximate 
the mean and distribution of marginal values for parcel area and on-site parking area. 
                                                 
29 Our empirical testing indicates that spatial autocorrelation is negligible, therefore we estimate models where ρ =0 
and do the simulations based on these models. 
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5. Minimum Parking Requirements, Data and Variables  
 
5.1. Data Sets 
Parcel-level data on non-residential property sales from 1996 through 2005 over a significant 
portion of Los Angeles County was obtained through Costar Group, a national commercial real 
estate information provider (www.costar.com). We removed several types of parcels30 not 
suitable for the analysis and data with missing variables.  In addition, we removed parcels whose 
characteristics indicated that they contained parking structures, including any parcels where 
building and parking area combined amounted to more than 110% of parcel space and any 
parcels where the property notes indicated underground parking or a parking structure.  The 
remaining data fit the definition of suburban properties given in the analytical section. This 
means that our data may understate the impact of parking regulations because we do not include 
properties in denser areas where the shadow cost of parking restrictions may be higher. 
The database contains the sales price of each property and a vector of structural 
characteristics (such as building square footage, parking lot spaces, and property code) and a 
vector of location characteristics (such as zip code, geographic zone, latitude, and longitude). We 
joined this data to information on median residential sale price by zip code for the years covered 
by the property sales. In order to put our parking space measure in the same units (square feet) as 
our other property area characteristics, we use an estimate of 350 square feet per space from a 
local parking expert (personal communication, Willson, 4/06/06), which includes all lanes, 
medians, etc., that accompany spaces.31 For robustness we also use a value of 300 square feet per 
space as a lower end estimate and re-estimate all specifications and simulations with that value 
(we do not use an upper end value because that would only strengthen the conclusions of the 
paper). 
The initial database assigned each observation as one of three general land use types: 
industrial, office or retail.  We divided the large number of retail properties into service, 
                                                 
30 Parking, public facilities, residential, heavy industrial, industrial park, pleasure retail, retail-residential, retail-
office, hi-rise-office.  We removed categories where there were few observations and where it was not clear how to 
group them with other categories.  Also, we dropped observations from 1996 because there were few observations. 
31 The data does not allow us to test whether it is parking area or the number of parking spaces that is valued by the 
market.  The linear transformation does not relax this constraint.  By transforming the parking space variables, the 
regressions are using units of 1/350th of a parking space, which is approximately equal to one square foot. 
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shopping, and general retail which resulted in five broad property categories (see Table 3).32  We 
used Los Angeles County local roll parcel data that contains the information on every parcel 
within Los Angeles County with GIS location information to generate the variables used to 
proxy for off-site parking availability.  We first matched the property sales data set to parcels in 
the Los Angeles County local roll data, and then used GIS techniques to identify all other parcels 
within a given radius of each sold parcel.  
 
5.2. The Variables 
The control variables ijtX  entering equation (16) are extensive. A complete listing of the 
variables and their definitions are available in Table 4. Summary statistics for key variables are 
presented by major land-use category in Table 5. The variables generally fall into two categories: 
property characteristics and neighborhood characteristics. Briefly, our property characteristics 
include property area (pcsqft), parking area (park), total building floor area (bldg), and building 
age (age).  All size measurements are in square feet. We expect the first three variables to have a 
positive marginal effect on the sale price, and building age to have a negative marginal effect.  
In addition, because demand for parking may increase with building floor area, we include an 
interaction term between parking and building size, parkbldg.33  We expect this interaction term 
to have a positive coefficient as a larger building may have a higher demand and value for 
parking.34   With the interaction terms the marginal value of parking or total building floor area 
can only be calculated by taking both coefficients into account.   
Also, we control for nearby parking (one-third mile radius as well) in publicly-available lots 
(pkgarg) and nearby parking in private, not publicly available, lots (pksup) because nearby off-
site parking could be a substitute for on-site parking.35 We expect the coefficients on these 
                                                 
32 Light industrial and industrial were combined into industrial and office-residential, office-industrial and lo-rise 
office into the office category. Dummy variables for these subcategories are included in all specifications. 
33 This interaction is log(park)*log(bldg). 
34 We also use dummy variables for year, property type, for four general geographic categories (Southwest Los 
Angeles, West San Fernando, San Gabriel, East San Fernando) and, following Ihlanfeldt and Taylor (2004), we also 
include a number of building construction and condition categories (see Table 4 for the categories). The full set of 
regression results is available on request from the authors. 
35 A review of walking distance literature (NJtransit (1994)) finds that most studies show that maximum walking 
distances are between .25 to .5 miles, with more studies in the .25 range.  Therefore we chose one-third of mile as an 
approximation of walking distance. We also ran the same specifications with a .5 mile radius for ldens, pkgarg, 
pksup and found similar parameter values. 
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variables to be positive as prices should be higher in denser areas and also higher where there is 
more nearby parking.  
Finally, we roughly proxy for underlying land values by including the median house price in 
the zip code of the property (logDQprice) and total building floor area per square foot land area 
in a one-third mile radius (ldens). We expect the coefficients to be positive. 
 
 
6. Parking Regulation Test 
Equation (15) in the analytic model outlines the basic framework for the indirect test of 
parking requirements. It is likely that for some properties MPR’s bind and the marginal value of 
additional parking spaces is less than the marginal cost of a parking space, but for other parcels 
MPRs do not bind: 
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  Properties are likely to differ in both their parking requirements and their marginal value of 
parking.  Our estimate of the marginal value of parking and land comes from equation (23). We 
use a marginal cost of asphalt paving of $1.50-a square foot.36  
Our indirect test is very similar to Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) who use the gap between real 
estate prices and the costs of producing a marginal apartment to measure the distortions in the 
Manhattan housing market caused by zoning restrictions on new construction. The key idea of 
this approach is that in a competitive market, price will equal (minimum) average cost. In the 
absence of restrictions on heights or space for construction, buildings should rise to a point 
where the marginal cost of adding an additional floor equals the market price of the additional 
floor. If building higher is less profitable per square meter than building over a greater area, still 
we should expect the marginal cost of an extra floor to be equal to price. The gap between the 
observed market price and the marginal construction cost can be interpreted as a “regulatory” 
                                                 
36 A $2.50 average cost comes from a personal communication with Andy Youngs, California-Nevada Cement 
Council, 7/06/07.  However a survey of ten parking-construction firms in Los Angeles we conducted found that in 
some cases costs are in the $1.50 per square foot range for asphalt parking lots.  We use the lower figure as it is the 
more conservative one in this context.  
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tax, that is, the additional cost of space resulting from the regulation in that particular market. If 
the sales price of an additional floor of apartment space exceeded the marginal cost of building 
this additional floor then developers would have an arbitrage opportunity. Thus, Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2003) conclude that the difference between the price of floor space and its cost of 
construction must be due to some form of regulation.37 
 
7. Empirical Results 
 
The estimation results are presented in tables 6 and 7 and are briefly discussed below.  
 
Hedonic Price Models 
Equation (17a) is estimated using sale prices over the period 1997-2005. The length of this 
period provided a reasonable number of sales for each of the five land-use categories: industrial 
facilities, service retail buildings, shopping retail buildings, general retail buildings and office 
buildings. Therefore, we estimated specifications of each property category individually and an 
overall pooled model. 
 We estimated models with spatial error correlation, spatial error correlation and lag terms, 
and then with spatial error correlation and heteroskedasticity.  The spatial lag coefficient was 
insignificant and small in all specifications and the estimated coefficients were similar to the 
models with spatial correlation alone.  We also employed a Bayesian approach for allowing 
heteroskedasticity (LeSage (1999)).  There is evidence of significant heteroskedasticity, but these 
specifications have very similar coefficients and standard errors to the specifications with spatial 
correlation alone. Because the spatial error correlation control appears to generate similar results 
as the other spatial models we tested and is less complicated, we present the spatial error 
correlation results. Table six reports the coefficient estimates. In addition, the table shows the 
values of the various test statistics and their corresponding z-values values in parenthesis. 
                                                 
37 While this methodology rests on established microeconomic principles and is not demanding in terms of data and 
estimation techniques, its downside is that it does not differentiate between costs that are imposed by different 
aspects of regulation but is an aggregate measure of the cost of all regulatory constraints taken together: FAR 
restrictions, MPRs, other restrictions on land supply or even delays in decision making.  
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The high adjusted- 2R value (i.e. 0.83) is a favorable result for the model. The office, general 
retail and industrial equations each explain over 79% of the variation in sales prices within each 
of their respective categories.  
 The marginal effects of the property attributes are of the expected sign and generally highly 
significant in the pooled model (all property types). Sales prices are higher for buildings with 
greater property area. The coefficient on property area (lpcsqft) is positive and significant at the 
1% level. The coefficient on age (lage) is negative and significant at the 1%, as expected. This 
robust negative effect of age suggests that newness, reflecting quality, is a characteristic also 
valued in the non-residential market. The coefficients on each of the nearby parking measures 
(lpksup and lpkgarg) are significant as expected and positive at the 1% level.  Also, the 
coefficient on lDQprice is significant and positive at the 1% level, again as expected.  Finally, 
the ldens coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that, as expected, 
denser areas have higher property prices.  The coefficients are generally consistent across the 
individual property-type regressions. 
The coefficients on logpark, logbldg, and logparkxlogbldg need to be understood jointly 
since we are interested in the marginal effect of parking and building, and not so much the 
individual coefficients. The coefficients on logpark and logbldg are each negative and significant 
at the 1% level.  However, the marginal effect of parking area and building area are positive over 
the range of the data because the interaction term logparkxlogbldg has a positive coefficient 
(significant at the 1% level).  It is key to include this interaction term because the analytical 
section predicts that parking should have a higher marginal value the larger the building floor 
area, ceteris paribus, and the positive coefficient on the interaction term supports this hypothesis. 
 
Parking Regulation Indirect Test 
Table 7 presents the results for our indirect test. The table has two panels: one for an average 
area required per parking space of 350 square feet and the other for a 300 square foot average. 
The results suggest that parking requirements are binding for the majority of properties. We 
define MPRs as binding for a given property when the estimated value of the left-hand-side 
(LHS) of Equation (24) is significantly greater than the right-hand-side (RHS) of Equation (24) 
at the 5% level (two-sided).  For all properties (row 1) approximately 82% of properties appear 
to have binding MPRs. However, this masks significant variation.  Retail Shopping properties 
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are estimated to have binding MPRs in only about 19% of the cases, while Service Retail 
properties have binding MPRs for 98% of the properties.  
The scale of the social loss from MPRs is related to the difference between the RHS and LHS 
of Equation (24), not just whether MPRs bind. The mismatch between the costs and the marginal 
willingness to pay for parking area suggests that too many resources are being allocated towards 
the construction of parking spaces. The last two columns of Table 7 give a sense of this 
mismatch.  
For all properties, parcel area plus construction costs are approximately $21/ ft2 more than 
the marginal value of parking area.  Suppose, for the sake of argument that the other relevant 
distortions in the market such as environmental externalities, congestion and parking spillover 
net out. Then our empirical analysis implies that the deadweight loss due to minimum parking 
requirements in the Los Angeles suburban properties in our dataset is in the order of $1.5 billion 
(total parking sqft (75,845,000)*$21/ ft2).  The total area of properties in our data set is 1,741 
acres or about 2.7 square miles, compared to 498 square miles in the City of Los Angeles alone. 
However, we do not know the total area in Los Angeles that could be classified as suburban 
commercial or industrial parking area- which is the relevant comparison for our data. 
Again, there is significant variation in this difference across property types. For service retail, 
the parcel area is worth approximately $42/ft2 more than parking space area.  This suggests that 
the social loss from MPRs in the service retail category is quite large (per area). Since our 1547 
service retail properties have 10,287,000 sqft of surface parking this implies a deadweight loss of 
$488,529,630 (10,287,000*$47.49/ft2). In contrast, for industrial areas, parcel area is only worth 
approximately $8/ ft2 more than parking space area, which implies that MPRs have 
comparatively low social cost per area for industrial properties. The total surface parking in the 
industrial category amounts to 29,376,000 sqft, which implies a deadweight loss of $138,654,720 
(29,376,000*$4.72/ft2). 
 Our results thus suggest that reducing parking standards for general retail, service retail and 
office uses will be a successful strategy in encouraging new development to provide fewer 
parking space on average. In contrast, this strategy will be less successful for shopping retail and 
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industrial uses, which seem to either have lower standards relative to demand or be less sensitive 
to minimum parking standards.38  
The estimated mean marginal land values used to calculate parking costs are somewhat lower 
than the per square foot land values in the Los Angeles area for vacant land.  An analysis (Cutter 
et al. (2008)) shows the value of vacant land zone industrial averaged $38 ft2 and vacant land 
zoned commercial averaged $98/ ft2.  Because vacant land may not be representative of land 
values overall, we do not expect the marginal value of land to exactly equal the value of vacant 
land.  However, the analysis of vacant land prices suggests that our land values are conservative 
and therefore our indirect test of whether MPRs bind is conservative.39 
If minimum parking requirements force developers to supply parking beyond what the 
market is willing to pay for, then profit-maximizing developers will try to mitigate the negative 
effect from parking provisions on profits by economizing for example in space with more 
compact spots, narrower aisles, and other measures to minimize paved area. In this setting, the 
350 ft2 parking size estimate would be too large for some property types. Therefore, we have also 
re-estimated the models and simulations using a 300 ft2 estimate to test the robustness of the 
results. This is a low-end estimate of the total area per parking space that could be achieved with 
Los Angeles area parking regulations. In general, the difference between the total parking costs 
and parking values narrows but not substantially. The estimated percentage of properties where 
the MPRs bind fall by three percentage points to 79 percent for all properties.  Even in this low 
parking space size scenario it appears that MPRs bind for a large majority of properties.  
 
8. Conclusions 
Minimum parking regulation is a pervasive feature of United States land-use practices.  
Davidson et al. (2002) state that parking planning questions are among the top five queries for 
the American planning service each year. Authors such as Shoup (1999), Willson (1995) and 
Davidson et al. (2002) have suggested that parking regulation forces developers to place far more 
                                                 
38 For instance large shopping retail tends to want a lot of spaces to deal with the Christmas Rush. 
39 One curious result from these regressions is the negative marginal value accorded to parking area in the service 
retail category.  A negative marginal value is plausible if the MPRs are so high that additional parking area adds no 
value to the lot and there are significant expenses for cleaning, maintenance, and occasional replacement of the 
parking lot.  The negative $8.69/ ft2 marginal value could be accounted for by a maintenance and upkeep cost of 
$.78/ ft2 per year. This is plausible since asphalt must be replaced every 10-15 years at a cost of $2-$3/ ft2, and 
periodic maintenance and cleaning is required by water quality regulators for many of these properties. 
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parking spots than necessary on their lot. Arnold and Gibbons (1996) detail the destructive 
environmental effects of excessive impermeable surfaces. Shoup (1999) also suggests that 
parking regulations may have a dynamic effect where the design requirements of large parking 
areas render new development pedestrian unfriendly so that more individuals are forced to travel 
by car.  
However, to our knowledge, the evidence that parking requirements increase the amount of 
parking spaces built is limited to a few case studies. This paper seeks to remedy that by 
examining whether there is evidence of a parking regulation effect for sold properties in Los 
Angeles County.   
Our analytical results show that when MPRs bind, the excess parking results in a deficit for 
the developer of a new building. This induced deficit constitutes an indirect tax on building 
square footage. As a result, this creates a disincentive to high-density development because it 
imposes an extra wedge between the marginal revenue gain from additional building square 
footage and the marginal construction costs. Since the marginal cost of providing more parking 
spaces at a site usually increases dramatically for underground structures, this parking tax is also 
higher for larger buildings.  
Our analytical model of optimal development of a parcel also implies that the marginal value 
of parking should be less (equal) to the marginal value of land for a parcel plus the construction 
cost of parking in the presence (absence) of binding minimum parking regulations. We test this 
proposition for a multi-year dataset of sales and for six different property types using a spatial 
error model.  We find that for the majority of properties a null hypothesis of equality between 
marginal parking and marginal land plus construction costs is rejected at a 5% significance level. 
This supports the idea that minimum parking requirements significantly affect the amount of 
parking on a parcel. The magnitudes of the differences in the marginal quantities suggest that 
parking minimum requirements have large effects on the distribution of parcel space between 
various uses.  Further research should examine the quantitative impact of parking minimums on 
the aggregate amount of parking and impervious space. 
If the goal of minimum parking requirements is to prevent parking spillover and traffic 
congestion associated with cruising for on-street parking, our results suggest that MPRs are a 
blunt and inefficient form of parking management. Other forms of parking pricing that accounts 
for social externalities can be a superior parking management (Small (1992), Shoup (2004, 
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2005), Arnott et al. (2005)). For example, Arnott et al. (2005) show that an efficient on-street 
parking pricing scheme can produce travel time savings from reducing traffic congestion and 
wasteful cruising-for-parking activity and at the same time raise government revenues which can 
be used to reduce distortionary taxation.40  
This research provides thus further evidence for the arguments of Shoup (1999) and Willson 
(1995) that parking minimums significantly distort land-use decisions.  In addition, the evidence 
that, in some cases, parking use value is a small fraction of parcel land value suggests that the 
efficiency losses from parking minimums may be quite large.  However, a full consideration of 
the optimal level of off-street parking would have to consider the congestion externalities due to 
lower requirements as well as the environmental benefits of less parking. 
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40 Arnott et al. (2005) also emphasize the need to examine policies that might complement congestion pricing, such 
as appropriately pricing freight and mass transit; staggering work hours for government employees; encouraging 
biking and walking; and improving the design of roads and intersections to improve traffic flow. Small (1992) 
discusses the design of a package of congestion charges and revenue uses that may be more politically feasible and 
thus, look attractive to most people. The author also discusses the potential amounts and uses of money raised by 
congestion pricing on all congested freeways and arterials in the five-county Los Angeles region. His numerical 
calculations of the effects of this package on various individuals confirm that such a package can create net benefits 
for a wide spectrum of individuals and interest groups. 
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